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RAILROADS: LIABILITY OF LESSOR FOR NEGLIGENCE OF LESSEE
RESULTING IN INJURY TO LESSEE'S SERVANT.
In the recent case of Arline v. Ry. Co., 138 Fed. 169, which
arose under an Ohio statute providing that, where a railroad
company leases its road, it shall be jointly liable with the lessee
on all rights of action arising from the negligent operation or
maintenance of the road, it was held that the statute applied only
to actions arising from a breach of duty as a common carrier,
and did not render the lessor liable for the negligent operation of
the road by the lessee whereby its employee was injured.
This appears to be one of the first cases to arise under the
statute in Ohio, but a number of cases arising under similar
statutes have been decided in other states during the last few years
and the present case seems to follow the line of decisions favored
by the weight of authority. The proposition that where a rail-
road company leases its property, to be operated by another road,
the lessor company is liable for all the torts of the lessee, cannot
be supported. The lessor company by virtue of its charter as-
sumes the obligation to perform certain duties for the public in
carrying freight and passengers, and in observing statutory pre-
cautions for the protection of the public from danger in the oper-
ation of its road. When it shifts to another company the burden
of the discharge of these duties to the public, any loss resulting
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to any member of the public from a failure by its lessee to dis-
charge them may be made the basis for a claim for damages against
the lessor company, Abbot v. Ry Co., 8o N. Y. 27. The duty
owing from the lessee company to its employees is, however, one
which arises wholly from contract, and is not imposed by the
charter of incorporation. The lessor company is not obliged to
employ any particular members of the public. A person entering
the service of the lessee company, therefore, acquires no right
against the lessee except by virtue of the contract of employment.
Such an employee comes into no privity of contract with the lessor
company and cannot hold it liable for the negligence of the lessee
whereby he is injured. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 86 Va. 629; Lee v.
RY. Co., 116 Cal. 97; Banks v. Ry. Co., 112 Ga. 655. The same
rule applies where there is no statute authorizing the lease of the
road. Ry. Co. v. Culberson, 72 Tex. 375.
In Ry. Co. v. Hart, 7o N. E. 654 and Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 49 Ga.
355, the courts held that the lessor was liable for an injury to a
servant of the lessee, resulting from the lessee's negligence, but in
view of the fact that in the former case three justices dissented
and in the latter the immediate question was not the sole ground
upon which the decision was based, the cases are deprived of
much weight as authority upon the question,
It is conceded that the liability in tort may be enforced against
the lessor company, where the person injured is a member of
the public, with a right to rely upon the discharge of the duties
assumed by the lessor company in the operation of the road. Such
persons are shippers and passengers, who have a common-law right
to the exercise of peculiar care by the common carrier and
travelers upon the highway, who have a statutory and common-
law right to such a reasonable and careful operation of the road
as shall not unduly injure them in the pursuit of their lawful
rights, Ry. Co. v. Curl, 28 Kan. 222; Freeman v. Ry. Co., io N.
W. 594; Arrowsmith v. Ry. Co., 57 Fed. 165. This principle,
however, is not involved in the present case.
There is one class of cases where the lessor may be held liable
to the employees of the lessee, i. e., where the duty is retained by
it to keep the road in repair and the lessee's servant is injured by
its failure to do so. In such cases where the injury results
directly from the negligence of the servant of the lessor or from
the negligence of the company itself, the lessor is liable. Here
it is the duty of the lessor to keep the road in a safe and proper
condition for use, and to exercise the care in the management
of the road and its appliances that is necessary to prevent any
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injury arising from that source. This duty is imposed by the
common law irrespective of any contract. A sufficient privity,
in all cases of this class, exists between parties from and to whom
duties are owing, when their breach is the cause of the injury.
Here there is a legal duty owing to the servant, irrespective of
the contract between the lessor and the lessee, and though he can
sustain no action on the contract, he can for neglect of duty. These
duties involve the safety and security of those who are in the law-
ful use of the road and are of a general and public character, and
for their non-performance any person particularly injured can
sustain his action. Smith v. Ry. Co., i N. Y. 127; Merrill v. Ry.
Co., 54 Vt. 200; Sawyer v. Ry. Co., 27 Vt. 370; Nugent v. Ry.
Co., So Me. 62.
THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK, AS APPLIED TO THE BREACH
)F SPECIFIC DUTIES IMPOSED BY STATUTE.
When a statute imposes upon the employer some specific
duty for the protection of the employee, and the employer fails to
comply with the requirements of the statute, and by reason thereof,
the employee is injured, whether or not the employer is liable, is
a question upon which there is much conflict.
There seem to be three doctrines. One doctrine is still that the
statutory provisions imposing specific duties upon the employer
for the protection of the employee, do not change the common-law
rule, relating to obvious risks, and that the servant may waive
compliance with-the statute. Goodrich v. Washington Mills Co.,
i6o Mass. 234. The cases which support this doctrine, hold that
where a servant enters into the employment of his master, know-
ing of the dangers and of the failure to comply with the statute,
which is obvious, he cannot recover for injuries received during
the course of his employment. They hold that he-impliedly agrees
to assume the risks of the employment. This being so, the master
owes him no duty and he cannot say that the master was negligent
in failing to supply the safeguards required by statute. O'Maley
v. Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135. Some of these cases reason that
if the requirements of the common law may be waived, why can-
not the requirements of statutes be waived? No reason can be
found why a man may not accept the obvious risks of his employ-
ment, under a statute, as well as at common law. He may be in-
duced to do so by higher wages. The statute does not deprive
a man of his free agency. Monzie v. Friedline, 33 N. Y. App.
Div. 217.
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Another class of cases goes upon the theory that if the statute
is a mere affirmation of the common law, the rule as to assumption
of risk remains the same. But if the statute sets up a definite
standard and requires specific measures, to be taken by the em-
ployer, other considerations come up. The fact of such legislation
shows that the common law rules did not afford sufficient protec-
tion to the employee; that the employee did not stand upon a foot-
ing of equality with the employer in contracting for his safety.
On account of these conditions the legislature required certain
specific measures to be taken for his protection. The -standard
of safety is no longer left to the employer. How then can there
be any lawful contract that the employer shall violate the law and
not be liable for it? An agreement that the employee shall waive
the breach by the master, of an obligation imposed upon him by
statute is void as against public policy. Baddeley v. Granville, i
Q. B. Div. 423; Durant v. Mining Co., 97 Mo. 62; Narramore v.
R. R. Co., 96 Fed. 298. These cases hold that the common law
rule has nothing to do with a breach of a specific duty imposed
by statute upon the employer; that the knowledge by the servant,
that the master has not complied with the statute will not prevent
him from recovering damages for injuries resulting from such
breach of duty. Hochstetter v. Coal Co., 8 Ind. App. 442. This
was the finding of Indiana court in the recent case of Indiana & C.
Co., v. Neal, 15 N. E. 295. In the case of Quackenbush v. R. R.
Co., 62 Wis. 411, the statute required all railroad companies to
fence their road. The plaintiff entered into their employment,
knowing that the road was not fenced. He was killed as a result
of defendant's breach of duty, and the court held the company
liable. They said that if the plaintiff knew the road was un-
fenced, he must also be presumed to know that the statute pro-
tected him.
The third class of cases has for its theory that a sharp dis-
tinction must be drawn between assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence. A man may continue in dangerous work.
knowing of the failure to comply with the statute and while tak-
ing great care to avoid any accident, be injured. These cases hold
that he may recover in such a case. But if he has been guilty of con-
tributory negligence he cannot of course recover. In a Michigan
case, an employee was killed as a result of the employer's breach.
The court held the company not liable but expressly stated that
it would have been liable but for the contributory negligence of
the employee. Grand v. R. R. Co., 83 Mich. 564. This last
doctrine seems to be the soundest, both in reason and in justice.
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MUST EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE NECESSARY FOR A CONVICTION BE
PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?
In line with the recent agitation over the great, and often un-
necessary and unfair, handicap of technicalities against which the
state must contend to convict a guilty person of his crime, comes
the case of State v. Blydenburgh, IO4 N. W. 1014 (Iowa). In
that case-all the evidence that the accused poisoned his wife be-
ing circumstantial-the majority of the court hold that a refusal
to give an instruction to the jury that "each fact in the chain of
circumstances necessary to be established to prove the guilt of the
accused, must be proven by competent evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt," was not error, the jury having elsewhere been in-
structed that each of the fact elements of the crime must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus the case stands as authority for the
statement that while the state must prove the crime in its entirety,
and also each constituent element of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt, yet every fact which, though not a distinct element of
the crime, is nevertheless essential to a conviction, need not be so
proved.
"There is a marked distinction," says Judge Deemer, in his
dissenting opinion, "between an essential element of a crime and a
fact or circumstance in a chain of circumstances essential to a con-
viction," and as an example of the latter he gives the rather
unsatisfactory illustration, from the present case, of "how the
poison came to be found in the stomach of the deceased." Now
the above distinction is abstruse, but when he cautions to avoid
Charybdis by distinguishing between "each link in the chain of
circumstances relied on by the State" and "every circumstance
or fact necessary for a conviction " (although this proposition
must be admitted to be correct), it is hard to imagine that an
ordinary jury, in the face of this double instruction would retire
to the jury room with a very clear notion of what was expected
of it.
Where the first of the above distinctions has been passed upon,
nevertheless (although it is hard to determine whether such a
distinction was really in the mind of the judges), the authorities
are with Judge Deemer and Judge Weaver. In the celebrated case
of Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 319, Chief Justice Shaw,
in the most careful of jury instructions, said: "The several circum-
stances upon which the conclusion depends must be fully estab-
lished by proof. They are facts from which the main fact is to
be inferred by competent evidence and by the same weight and evi-
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dence as if each one were itself the main fact in issue. Under
this rule, every circumstance relied upon as material is to be
brought to the test of strict proof."
The instruction liable to be confounded with the one under
discussion, is to the effect that though the jury is not sure as to
the accused person's connection with some of the fact essentials
of the crime, nevertheless, if it is convinced of guilt, as a whole,
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it should find a verdict of guilty.
Illinois is the only state that sustains this instruction. "The
reasonable doubt the jury is permitted to entertain, must be as to
the guilt of the accused on the whole evidence and not as to any
particular fact in the case." Mullins v. People, iio Ill. 42. Lehigh
v. People, 113 Ill. 372. But in Bressler v. People, 8 N. E. 62, the
judge, while ostensibly upholding these decisions, practically admits
that the instruction was error, though in that case, ,"harmless."
For the collected authorities on the point see the case of Dr. Graves.
(32 Pac. 63.)
The great mistake in these instructions is the continued and
unfortunate use, on the part of the trial judge, of the metaphor
"link in the chain." To be sure, no chain is stronger than its
weakest link, but the metaphor is usually inapplicable. This is es-
pecially true in the case of the second of the two distinctions given
by Judge Deemer, to which the statement in Leonard v. Territory,
2 Wash. 381, that the different kinds of evidence to support a
point were rather a crowd than a chain and that many could be
absent without allowing escape, applies. The "cable" metaphor
(State v. Gleim, 41 Pac. iooi) in which the circumstances which
go to make up the ultimate facts and circumstances are the
"strands," is true enough, but not altogether satisfactory in direct-
ing the mind of a jury. But the "link-and-chain" metaphor is
almost universal, and as Judge Ladd remarks in State v. Cohen,
io8 Ia. 2o8, "is extremely likely to be misunderstood by the jury."
The omission of it in the present case, and in many others,
would have prevented much confusion.
